According to Tolstoy a Genuine Theory of Art Should Focus on

Leo Tolstoy'southward "What is Fine art?" and Plato'south Republic

1. contents:
   

I) Leo Tolstoy'southward "What is Art?"

1. A) On Leo Tolstoy
   

2. B) On Tolstoy'south Aesthetics
   

3. C) Summary and Analysis
   

Two) Plato's Republic

1. A) Introduction: On Plato'south Republic
   

2. B) Summary and Assay
   

III) Discussion Post Prompts

I) Leo Tolstoy's "What is Art?," pp.178-81:

A) On Leo Tolstoy:

The Russian Count Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1828-1910) is primarily known every bit a writer of novels, stories, plays, and essays, although forged important theoretical paths in ethics (theoretically anarchist, socially pacifist), aesthetics, educational reform, and religious interpretation.  He was born into a notable, noble family, just his parents died when he was young, and he was raised by relatives (along with his four siblings).  Initially a bad student (although after learning over a dozen languages and becoming a famous writer), he left Academy early and spent time living the heavy gambling life earlier joining the army in 1851 (first in Caucasus and then fighting in the Crimean State of war), about the time he began writing.  In 1855 he left the army and in the late 1850'south, he became committed to an ascetic, non-vehement political program.  He is considered 1 the greatest Russian writers, with his most notable works being War and Peace and Anna Karenina , which embody his spiritual, political, and upstanding radicalism.  Falling in love in the 1860'southward, he married Sophia Andreevna Behrs (Sonya) in 1862 and they had 13 children.  Thereafter, he committed himself to his writing, although also travelled Europe, witnessing political unrest immediate and meeting notable influences from Victor Hugo to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (the French agitator).  Other potent influences on his thought include Arthur Schopenhauer'south aesthetics and ascetic ethics, Mahatmas Gandhi'due south Satyagraha (not-tearing ceremonious disobedience), and Henry George's economic theory.  He suffered an existential crisis in the belatedly 1870'southward, condign depressed and suicidal; after this, his political radicalism heightened and his writings further embodied intense political and religious critiques.  He was excommunicated from the Russian Orthodox Church, although his later years witnessed an intense, albeit radical, embrace of the teachings of Jesus (his The Kingdom of God is Inside Yous , of 1893, reread the Bible equally centered upon the thought of loving one's neighbour and turning the other cheek).

B) On Tolstoy'southward Aesthetic Theory:

According to notes we find in Tolstoy's letters and journals, we learn that he spent about xv years rethinking his earliest assumptions most aesthetic theory (especially concerning literature) before writing his famous "What is Art?" essay in 1897.  His earliest writings on aesthetics surface in the 1850'due south and show his concentration to exist on the interplay of theory and practise.  In the 1880's, Tolstoy underwent a stark spiritual crisis that turned his predominately negative view of art more than positive: he came to view art no longer as a "deceit of culture," which could seduce people from the proficient, but as something positive that could benefit humanity and club.  This benefit flowed from his refined view of the intimate and necessary upstanding principle contained within art.  Art and morality could not be separated.  He connected to believe in the seductive power of fine art, and used this principle to differentiate true fine art from the apocryphal type, work that masqueraded every bit art.  All art is infectious--if this strong contagiousness is sincere, than the work is true fine art.  Because of this power, his aesthetic theory hinges on the decision of how fine art is fabricated by feeling and how it transmits feelings to its audition.  Good art, that is, true art, correctly and powerfully conveys feeling.  Art makes united states of america feel and essentially empathize a unity of humankind.  As the album'south introduction notes, we see in Tolstoy's aesthetics the "Russian impulse toward unification and communication," and his adult position that "fine art succeeds when information technology arouses and transmits emotion, when it brings people together and enriches their common humanity" (177).

C) Summary and Analysis:

Tolstoy'due south "What is Art?" is a clear, concise expression of how art must be an expression of an artist'due south emotion that is clearly communicated to recipients who then become "infected" past the affect and then as to thereby feel for themselves that same emotion: "The activity of art is based on the fact that a man receiving through his sense of hearing or sight some other human being'due south expression of feeling, is capable of experiencing the emotion which moved the man who expressed it" (178).

Tolstoy offers numerous examples of the transmission, for case, a person laughing makes those effectually him/her feel merry themselves.  The capacity we have for receiving this transferred emotion, perhaps something like empathy, is the basis upon which the action of art is based.

2. His choice of terminology is interesting!  "Infected;" "Transmission;" "Contamination;" the terms are medical, and conspicuously tie the theory to the body, to the senses, not just to reason or the mind solitary.  For more on his utilize of the medical illusion of infection, etc., cf., Jacob Emery, "Art is Inoculation: The Infectious Imagination of Leo Tolstoy," The Russian Review 70 (2011): 627-45. Available on JSTOR through the library.
   

Tolstoy continues past explaining how art begins and its aim. The object or aim of fine art is in "joining another or others to himself in 1 and the same feeling …" (178). Information technology begins, then, past the artist'southward external expression of his/her emotion.  This expression, as Tolstoy offers through an case of a boy'due south encounter with a wolf, tin can be done by relating the run into: he "describes himself, his condition earlier the see, the environs, the wood, his ain low-cal-headedness, and then the wolf'southward appearance, its movements, the distance between himself and the wolf, and so forth" (179).  This recounting of the experience, the narrative chronicle, engages the artist in a re-experience of the effect—s/he goes through it (affectively) once again in its telling (this re-experience is every bit important equally the experience aroused in another for the judgment of 10 to exist art).  Of course, while this example may exist the written or told art grade, the method can be mimicked in two-dimensional art, three-dimensional fine art, movie, music, dance, etc.  There is an of import question hither, all the same, as to how much the narrative is required. It is clear that Tolstoy's theory is based in the idea that art is communication, that it is communicative.  But, is there a tension between communication as a narrative transmission and Tolstoy'south greater accent that the advice is the creation of a contagion of affective experience?   Afterward existence exposed to the art, are nosotros to know something, or simply feel something?  His theory suggests the latter, just his description of the method suggests the quondam.

2. On this question of transmission, cf., S. K. Wertz, "Homo Nature and Art: From Descartes and Hume to Tolstoy," Journal of Aesthetic Education 32, n.three (1998): 75-81.  Bachelor on JSTOR through the library.
   

An additional important note about the 'how' of art is that the artist need not have experienced something in reality, but can invent an encounter , and then long as the invention transmits existent emotion.  "Even if the boy had not seen a wolf only had frequently been agape of one, and if, wishing to evoke in others the fear that he had felt, he invented an encounter with a wolf and recounted it so as to make his hearers share the feelings he feel when he feared the wolf, that also would exist art" (179).  This is important to connect to his afterward requirement about the sincerity of the artist ( cf. , p.180).  It is worthy of consideration as to whether we can expand and/or loosen this theory upward a piffling bit to propose whether the artist may not just have a fear of a specific thing, and so invents the story about that affair, but, rather, if southward/he may invent a story inspiration of the emotion in general.  For example, the boy need non take "frequently been afraid" of a wolf, but had experienced deep fear, perhaps of the night, of a violent fight, of spiders, of the unknown, or whatever else completely unconnected to wolves, and yet invents the story of the wolf and then as to arouse a like fear in others.  That is, how literal and direct must the object of the work exist?  Tolstoy's afterward annotate nigh judging "the quality of every piece of work of art considered apart from its subject affair" suggests that this may be a legitimate expansion (180), although his requirement about art being "individual" may work against this expansion (180).

Moving now to consider the feelings being communicated, Tolstoy explains that they are many and diverse (patriotism, devotion, religious, honey, courage, merriment, etc.), and tin be "very strong or very weak, very important or very significant, very bad or very good …" (179).  There are many questions that must be explored concerning these feelings, cf. below for more than on this point.

Tolstoy sums up his theory in the two italicized paragraphs on p.179:

1. To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once feel and, having evoked it in oneself then by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experience the same feeling—this is the activity of fine art.
   

2. Art is a human being activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of sure external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and likewise experiences them …. (p.179).
   

Note, hither, that art, then, is restricted to being a conscious human enterprise—the grand canyon or chirping of a bog total of frogs cannot be art; paintings washed by gorillas or cats cannot be art; an aggregation of objects done accidentally by a person cannot be art.

Tolstoy then moves to a consideration of judging excellence in art.  This is done past determining the "degree of infectiousness" of art (179).  "The stronger the infection the better is the art …" (179).  The subject matter itself is not to exist considered—so, if it is a painting of a teacup full of kittens or a battleground, a composition performed with kazoos or violins, such things are irrelevant.

There are iii conditions for this caste of infectiousness , although Tolstoy also argues that they tin can be reduced to the nearly important, third condition:

(1) The greater or lesser individuality of the feeling

1. "Individual" is an interesting and ambiguous designation—does this mean "personal" or "unique?"  For example, would a greatly individual feeling be femininity expressed by a woman artist, disassociation expressed by a schizophrenic, piety expressed past a priest?  Or, would it be more like the feeling of fear of being lost in the alps when one is twelve on a cloudy day?  Or, more than similar a peculiar melancholy that is as well anxious and happy?
   

(2) The greater or bottom the clarity of the feeling

1. Presumably, the clarity is that the feeling being transmitted itself is very clear (anger is acrimony—something unambiguous).  Information technology is worth while to pay close attention to exactly how Tolstoy describes this condition: "The clearness of expression assists infection because the recipient who mingles in consciousness with the author is the better satisfied the more clearly the feeling is transmitted which as information technology seems to him he has long known and felt and for which he has simply at present plant expression" (180).
   

2. Note in this quote all the supplemental issues that are raised:
   

3. --The audience "mingles in consciousness with the writer"—we can imagine some shared space of affective consciousness into which art brings united states; "mingling" suggesting something more than dynamic and cooperative than a mimetic theory wherein the audience's experience mimics the artist'southward feel.
   

4. --The audience's reception of the emotion causes the feeling of satisfaction—and then, the audition feels both emotion X and satisfaction.
   

5. --The audience experiences (likewise?) a feeling of revelation—equally if s/he had long known the emotion X, simply at present information technology is finally concretized in expression.  Here, it is not pure novelty (which ties to the first condition), but a 'new old' realization.
   

(3) The greater or lesser the force of the feeling in the artist (his/her "sincerity")

1. This condition Tolstoy sites equally the most important, and can embrace the other 2.  The sincerity rests in the intentions of the artist—does due south/he create for her/himself or for others?  When the audience feels it is for her/himself, the sincere force is neat, and thus the work is a ameliorate class of fine art; when the audience feels it is created for others, the sincere force of the art is lessened dramatically.  In this latter example, the art tin cease to even be art, and can exist repulsive, rather than bonny.

   

Tolstoy (the adept Russian) considers "peasant art" to always be the nigh sincere form of fine art, and acts most strongly upon united states of america; in contrast, "upper-class art," which is the prevailing norm, is the least sincere and has the weakest affective power over us.  Interestingly, today we may wonder if the nearly pop art of today is the strongest affectively over us, but in a wholly new manner, a less genuine mode—nosotros are so indoctrinated into a certain aesthetic view that it forms the basis of what we deem art, and yet it does not arouse a truthful, authentic community empathy, simply only invites us to be further entangled in the constructed and sold to usa world view?

{Image: Ivan Kramskoy, "Peasant with a Bridle," 1883, oil on canvas,

The Museum of Russian Art]

All iii of these conditions must be met for something to be art.  The degree of these conditions is that past which we judge the excellence of the piece of work.

[Prototype: Vasily Perov, "Religious Procession in the Village on Easter," 1861, oil on sheet, The State Trytyakov Gallery, Moscow]

Related Resource on Russian Art:

On the Peredvizhniki (The "Wanderers" or Itinerants," creative and social motion)

An Overview of Russian Art Movements after 1850

Ii) Plato's Republic, pp.9-44:

(Image: a fragment of a manuscript of Plato'south Republic)

A) Introduction: On Plato's Republic

(note: our anthology picks upwardly in Volume II; beneath, I take a sketch of what happens simply before our reading, which may help you lot better understand what is going on and its importance!)

Plato's Republic is a true philosophical and literary masterpiece.  Information technology is significantly longer than Plato'southward others works, although written, like most of them, as dialogue and utilizing an extended form of his (his/Socrates') standard " elenchos "—a dialogic, dialectical method of argumentation that seeks to reply a 'what is X?' question by a process of the interlocutor(due south) putting forth proposes that he/Socrates then unravel(s); as with all his dialogues, at that place is not an 'respond' at the end, just the whole reveals a moving closer to the truth and catastrophe in perplexity (aporia).

The 'what is X?' question of the Democracy is, specifically, "justice," and is more than broadly addressed past asking 'what is the platonic lodge?' Book I begins with Socrates recounting his trip the day before with Glaucon to the Piraeus (the port of Athens) to find a new religious festival the city was hosting.  Socrates and Glaucon are leaving the festival when intercepted and persuaded to stay, have a repast and run into a horse race (we never are told of the repast and equus caballus race once again; instead, the ensuing conversation of the dialogue becomes the main upshot).  Book I recounts Socrates' conversations with 3 men, Cephalus (the elderly father), Polemarchus (Cephalus' son), and Thrasymachus (a sophist, a rhetorician who privileges 'winning' debates more than than speaking 'truthfully').  The topic of their conversations is justice .  Thrasymachus' position is severe: justice does not pay; just suckers are just; thus, truthful 'justice' (read: what nosotros would call injustice) is the volition of the strongest—the strong should just help themselves and take advantage of others.  This is highly discordant to Socrates' position, which is suggesting that true justice is good, and to be just is to alive the worthwhile life (and worthwhile for all, not simply the strong).  The book ends with Socrates complaining that they are talking nigh whether justice pays or not without explaining what justice is in itself.

Book Ii opens with Socrates wishing to leave, and his interlocutors not wanting him to go—Glaucon complains that Socrates has non convinced them that justice is truly good (that is, good in itself and not just good considering it brings results or rewards).  To get Socrates to convince them better, Glaucon gives a very strong spoken language in defence of injustice that:

1. (1) shows the origin of justice and what justice is,
   

2. (2) why no one wants justice for its own sake, but practice information technology unwillingly, and
   

3. (3) why this is sensible considering injustice is truly better than justice.
   

His speech proposes three debates about human being nature:

1. (1) are humans naturally rational or non-rational?,
   

2. (2) are humans naturally political or non-political (i.eastward., are nosotros naturally cooperative or competitive?)?, and
   

3. (3) are humans naturally equal or unequal?
   

He argues that injustice is naturally skilful, simply to suffer it is bad—this means that humans are naturally competitive and desire to outdo one some other, thus, it is not natural for united states of america to work together and being political (being role of a polis, a urban center) is a convention (it is not natural).  He argues that we only come up to live together past a "social contract," a applied compromise, thus, justice is a compromise between what nosotros want (to be best) and what we could suffer (injustice).  Thus, the truly potent and powerful would not obey laws, and could get away with not doing and then; they only brand laws that do good themselves.

To prove his point, he tells the story of "The Band of Gyges:" a shepherd finds a ring that belonged to Gyges' ancestor—this ring makes one invisible.  Imagine, then, what would you do if yous had a band that fabricated you invisible?  What would you lot practice if you knew you could

not be seen, could not get caught?  The shepherd kills the king and marries the queen and assumes power.  Glaucon tells the story to suggest that nosotros are but ever brainwashed by society that nosotros are adept, that being good is merely a convention, and our truthful homo nature becomes revealed if we are 'out of sight' of the law and judgment of others.  If given this power, he argues, nosotros would revert to our 'natural' state and take advantage of others—thus, he says, injustice is always ameliorate.  Adeimantus then gives a philosophical defense to further Glaucon's position past arguing that all conventional teaching and arguments for justice are very weak—they educate those who do not question to be ruled and controllable and secretly railroad train the very clever to be the strongest and how to successfully be unjust and win.

Now, Socrates must respond!  He begins to give a defence for justice by a thought experiment concerning the ideal city.  He first gives an account of what is later dubbed the "City for Pigs," that is, a very bones utopic sketch of a city where all our basic needs are satisfied and we all just get along.  Glaucon complains it is besides naïve.  So, Socrates recasts his city as the "Luxurious City," which is more than realistic and far more detailed.  The members of his get-go utopia increase their desires, thus fill out the city with arts and sciences to produce more luxuries.  The increase of desires means that the city needs to develop a war machine to become to war with neighbors to proceeds more than land and riches.  With these needs, all of the other aspects of the metropolis develop.  This will pb to an unjust society, thus Socrates proposes his programme to purify, to reform this luxurious metropolis into the platonic city.  This leads Socrates to talk about the dissimilar sectors of society, what they must be like, and how nosotros best train them, and well-nigh what we permit and do non let in this city to make it the best we can.  This is where our reading in the anthology picks up—Socrates is talking about what the "guardians of the Land" (the soldiers) must be like. How this relates to aesthetics is considering the state must educate its people, and especially these rulers, and what they are taught, what they read, what they see, etc. are questions of what arts they are to exist beneficially or detrimentally exposed.

Thus, in review, think the characters in the dialogue:

1. Socrates: the 'star' of the dialogue, charged with defending justice every bit good, does so by telling the story of the ideal society (pictured to left);
   

2. Cephalus (quondam man): the host of the business firm where the dialogue takes place, he proposes the first 'definition' of justice;
   

3. Polemarchus (Cephalus' son): he proposes a second 'definition' of justice;
   

4. Thrasymachus (the sophist): he proposes the bombastic 'definition' of justice that it is only for the weak and the strong make 'justice' by existence unjust;
   

5. Glaucon (Socrates' friend): agrees with Thrasymachus' 'definition' of justice and argues that nosotros are naturally unjust past telling the story of the ring of Gyges;
   

6. Adeimantus (Glaucon's brother): agrees with Thrasymachus and furthers Glaucon's statement by arguing that electric current gild trains the weak to be sheep and the stiff to rule them 'unjustly' by benefitting themselves.
   

Retrieve, too, that the readings in our anthology pick up here in Book Two with Socrates' explanations of how we must educate the people of the ideal society, which involve the question of what arts are the youth in this ideal Country to be exposed?

B) Summary and Analysis of the Reading Assignment:

1. NOTE: bold green text, beneath, indicates proposed personal reflection questions for you to consider; these do non require written response, just may help direct your report to the key artful debates prompted by the Republic.
   

Book 2 (pp.9-16):

Socrates begins past discussing the "education of our heroes," the soldiers in this ideal urban center.  He proposes that the instruction take the two traditional divisions: "gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul" (p.9).  Past "music," he is broadly speaking of the arts, for music involves words, rhythm, and harmony, which parallel the components constitute in all the arts; the first discussions speak mainly of literature, while the latter move mainly to music, which then shows their parallel to all the arts.  This pedagogy in the arts (stories and song) begins before gymnastics (physical grooming), when the young are very immature.

Consider, in your own opinion, what is the power of stories?  How do they affect usa?  Does it matter what kind of stories we hear?  What kinds of stories does our society today tell?  Are they all the same from Homer, Greek tragedy, the Bible, or is it from movies, television, etc.?

Literature can be "true" or "imitation," they decide, roughly significant non-fiction and fiction.  Because the young are very impressionable, Socrates proposes that they must "establish a censorship of the writers of fictions"—that is, don't expose the very immature to 'bad' stories, things inappropriate to their age and tenderness (p.10).  The censorship must exist done to keep peoples' desires conforming to the perfection of their natural abilities (to let people blossom into their virtuous all-time selves, and not become decadent).

The stories that are to exist censored are those that contain "A fault which is about serious, … the fault of telling a prevarication, and, what is more, a bad lie" (p.10).  These "bad lies" include "erroneous representation … of the nature of gods and heroes, --equally when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original" (p.11).

The tertiary paragraph on page xi offers us an case of via Hesiod'southward account of Uranus and Cronus.

1. This is the creation myth in Hesiod's Theogony starring Uranus, the primal Greek god of the heaven and his mother and wife, Gaia, Mother Earth.  Gaia's first children, who Uranus hated, were the twelve Titans, the three Hekatonkheires (the 100-armed giants), and the Cyclopes (one-eyed giants).  Uranus imprisoned them deep in the Earth; Gaia commanded her sons to castrate Uranus; her son Cronus obeyed, and did just that.
   

So, Homer and Hesiod, while the greatest of storytellers, must be censored considering they tell stories where the gods are in conflict with i another.  The reasoning is that if we tell children nigh vengeful and warring gods, and gods are our heroes and office models, the children will get vengeful and warring.

"… these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical pregnant or not.  For a young person cannot approximate what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his heed at that age is probable to get indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is nearly important that the takes which the young first hear should exist models of virtuous thoughts" (p.eleven). What practise you think about this?

Adeimantus then asks Socrates about what should be permitted so far as stories get for the youth.  Socrates responds they are not poets themselves, but can outline the course that skillful stories should take.  "True" and good stories are those that promote truth, wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (the virtues).

(paradigm: Ancient (early on 6th c.) Greek Volute-krater, a vessel to mix wine and water, attributed to Sophilos.)

And so, the model stories tell (pp.12-16):

(1) Gods are skillful and causes of good: this eliminates the philosophical challenges of theodicy (the questions of why is at that place evil if God is expert?) by arguing that gods practice not brand bad things happen to people.

(two) Gods do not change: this teaches the youth and social club that gods are and remain good.

(3) Gods do not lie or deceive: this differentiates lies "in the soul," which are "truthful lies," and "lies in words," which may exist useful at times, eastward.g., to confuse the enemy, save a friend, or are hypotheses almost what we practise not know; lies in the soul are what we must avoid (they corrupt character), whereas lies in words are not e'er serious—only, gods practise not have lies.

(Image: The Armour of Akhilleus, Berlin, ca 490-80 bce)

Book Three (pp.16-32):

Volume Three continues the trajectory of 2 by outlining the content of stories, what they can and cannot have in them, and and then moves to their styles, songs, then onto physical preparation and what the rulers volition exist like.

(1) The beginning event is that the arts must encourage courage. To do this, they must "obliterate many obnoxious passages" that promote lowliness and fear (p.17).  The censorship is "not considering they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater poetical charm of them, the less are they run across for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death" (p.17).

(2) Next, they must censor horrible stories of the afterlife that make soldiers afraid (for this may make them cowardly).  Instead, they must promote a beautiful motion picture of the afterlife that makes a noble decease something good for which to strive.  "Reflect: our principle is that the adept man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade" (p.18).  This will keep soldiers from sorrow over the expiry of their comrades, and besides bolster the risk of his/her own decease.  And so, all the Greek tragedy that shows the profound lamentation over the death of others must be censored.

(three) Third, they must keep the guardians (soldiers) from excessive laughter. "For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to backlog almost always produces a vehement reaction" (p.nineteen).  And, the gods, also, cannot be represented as losing such cocky-restraint and giving in to fits of laughter.

(four) 4th, "truth should be highly valued," and they must abolish the common telling lies. Lies can be useful like medicine—but, this means that simply the "doctors" should be able to (have the knowledge to) use lies to the benefit of the whole.  Lies must be for the public good.  "Just nobody else should meddle with annihilation of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private homo to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own actual illnesses …" (p.20).  What do y'all think about this?

(5) Fifth, they must promote temperance: "… the chief elements of temperance [are] speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures" (p.20).

(vi) Sixth, they must not let stories lead the youth to "be receivers of gifts or lovers of money" (p.21).  This would encourage greed. Greed for money or gifts will pb to a desire for power, and atomic number 82 to insubordination.  "And therefore allow us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young" (p.23).

Thus, they accept laid out the weather condition of what the poets must not say about the gods.  At present, they must turn to what the poets tin and cannot say about humans.  "… poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are frequently happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a homo's own loss and another's gain—these things we shall foreclose them to utter, and command them to sing and say the contrary" (p.23).

Consider here how nosotros might see this in our popular culture—think about the glorification of master-heed criminals and gangsters and all the tragedies that bear witness bad things happening to proficient people.  Can you retrieve of examples?

Only … Socrates says, we cannot pursue this topic further without knowing what justice truly is and how information technology is naturally advantageous to the only.  Then, they will come up back to this topic after.  Now, they must motility to a consideration of what styles of song/verse/literature must be permitted and not permitted in their platonic society.

Styles of song/poetry/literature (pp.23-32):

Mythology and poetry are narrations of events past, present, or futural.  Narration may exist simple narration or imitation or a combination of the 2.

Simple narration is when the story-teller speaks in the beginning person, that is, as him/herself.

Imitation narration is when the story-teller speaks in the voice of one of his/her characters.

Their Combination is when the story-teller alternates between first person and false.

Wholly imitative narration often (or all-time) takes place in tragedy and comedy.

Simple narration often (or best) takes place in dithyramb.

Their combination often (or best) takes place in the epic and "several other styles of poetry" (p.25).

Pay close attention to the post-obit text:

1. "[Socrates:] In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic fine art,--whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to exist allowed by us to imitate, and if and so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation exist prohibited?
   

2. [Adeimantus:] You mean, I suspect, to enquire whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?
   

3. [Socrates:] Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I actually do not know every bit yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go" (p.25).
   

Mimetic art: art that uses mimesis.

Mimesis: imitation—a derivation of the Greek verb mimeisthai, "to imitate."  This is imitation especially in the representation or faux of the real in arts.  For the Greeks (and likewise widely held today), humans larn mimetically, by imitation (for example, consider a kid watching the world around him/her to learn how to speak, how to conduct, etc.).  This combines the nature versus nurture debate in the sense that it proposes that, by nature, we are mimetic (nosotros naturally imitate others) and we then become, by nurturing, a product of what we have imitated.  This offers the explanation for the censorship in society—we naturally imitate that to which we are exposed … if our "luxurious city" leads to abuse, and Socrates' platonic guild is built off of a "purification" or "reformation" of this "luxurious urban center," a way to purify corruption is to control education, control that to which we are exposed equally youth.

So … here, they will consider whether tragedy and one-act, the key styles of story-telling in any of the arts that are primarily mimetic forms (imitative) should be censored.

1. (As an additional notation, consider the very many layers of mimesis going on in the Democracy : recollect that Plato is the author of this dialogue in which Socrates is recounting the tale of this entire dialogue that had already taken place.  Thus, Plato is "imitating" Socrates as Socrates speaks in the beginning person present (recounting the whole dialogue), in the get-go person past (as he spoke during the dialogue'due south actual happening), and the 3rd person past (as he recounts what the other participants said).  For these other characters in the dialogue, Plato is imitating Socrates who is imitating the others.  Plato, then, is writing a wholly "imitative narrative" wherein he is imitating Socrates who is imitating himself ("unproblematic narration") and others ("imitative narrative"), which makes Socrates' narration, and then, a "combination of unproblematic and imitative narratives."  What do you think of this in low-cal of the following two quotes, beneath?)
   

They concord that "… 1 man can just exercise one thing well, and not many; and that if he endeavour many, he will birthday fail of gaining much reputation in any …" (25).  More specifically, faux succeeds when information technology is focused on a single art; "Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious role in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts also …" (25).  This means that the guardians ought to focus their energies, "… setting bated every other business, [they] are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of the freedom in the Land, making this their craft …" (26). If they are to imitate anything, information technology should only be good things, good function models that allow them to perfectly fulfill their functions as the guarantors of liberty. "Then he [whatsoever guardian] volition prefer a manner of narration such as we accept illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will exist both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former and a neat deal of the latter" (27).

There are others, though, Socrates adds, who will be the reverse: those who narrate (imitate) anything and everything—and, if this one is unscrupulous, every bit s/he will probable be, this can be a very worst sort of citizen, and non brand for a expert guardian.—These, and then, are the two styles of speaking: one who does both narration and fake, simply primarily narration, and another who does all simulated.  [They place these as 2 styles, here, merely keep in heed that at that place are really three categories of which they are speaking!]

"[Socrates:]And shall nosotros receive into our State all the three styles, or one merely of the two unmixed styles? Or would you include the mixed?

[Adeimantus:] I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.

[Socrates:] Yes, I said, Adeimantus; only the mixed way is also very mannerly: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is them most popular fashion with children and their attendants, and with the earth in full general.

[Adeimantus:] I practise non deny it.

[Socrates:] But I suppose that you lot would contend that such a style is unsuitable to our Land, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays 1 part only?

[Adeimantus:] Yeah; quite unsuitable" (28).

Thus, because truthful success comes to the person who concentrates all of his or her energy on perfecting ane form alone, the best art to admit in a urban center where each citizen lives upwardly to his or her all-time is this style that imitates only virtue.  In this city, nosotros do not want the sneakily seductive styles that corrupt audiences (children, peculiarly); instead, nosotros "mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or storyteller, who will imitate the manner of the virtuous but, and will follow those models which we prescribed at start when we began the education of our soldiers" (28).

This ends the discussions on the music and literary education of the youth equally it relates to story and myth.

(Click the prototype for a link to hear reproductions of ancient Greek instruments)

Next, they move to the topic of melody and song (28 ff.).

Songs or Odes have three parts:

(ane) Words — where there is no difference betwixt those set to music or those without;

(2) Tune —("harmony") dependent upon the words;

(3) Rhythm — too dependent upon the words (29).

These three components of music atomic number 82 Socrates and Adeimantus, first, to discuss HARMONY .  They identify harmonies that are expressive of (one) sorrow, (ii) drunkenness and softness, (3) bravery, and (4) peacefulness.  These categories place which harmonies volition be rejected from the ideal state (the starting time ii) and which will be maintained (the terminal ii).

" Harmony ," hither, roughly indicates a particular style of music or a tone ( tonos , what is later called "manner" and represents the arrangements of pitches in an octive) connected to a Greek subgroup (an indigenous group or peoples in a particular region or district inside the Greek empire)—i.e., "harmony" is not just a musical scale, just calibration plus rhythm, plus subject thing of the words, plus full register of the music.  In general, what we have from this section is the idea that music greatly affects listeners; it tin status their dispositions in the moment (e.g., an inspiring tune to encourage a solider in a moment of danger) and their characters in full (e.yard., to better or corrupt the moral fiber or grapheme of a course of people within society).  The four main harmonies are differentiated by their different ethical characteristics; these characteristics, then, dictate whether certain harmonies should exist permitted or rejected from the platonic land.

What do you believe about the affective powers of music?  Does music touch what you think and feel in the moment?  Does it but affect you in the moment, or does it condition who you are as a person?

Socrates claims "Of the harmonies I know naught," and thus describes the categories and asks Adeimantus to identify which harmonies relate to them; they make up one's mind (29):

(1) The harmonies expressive of sorrow are identified as the mixed or tenor Lydian and full-toned or bass Lydian—these must be banished from the Country.

(2) The harmonies expressive of drunkenness and softness are identified equally the Ionian and the Lydian—these must be banished, every bit well.

(three) The harmonies expressive of bravery are identified every bit the Dorian and the Phrygian—these will be kept.

(4) The harmonies expressive of peacefulness are identified equally the Dorian and the Phrygian, every bit well—and these volition be kept.

1. The Lydian: Lydia, from which the name and this "style" came, was an aboriginal kingdom in Anatolia; its ethical graphic symbol was thought to be intimate and lascivious (non in the sense of virility, simply emotional softening).  In ancient Greek musical theory, the Lydian denoted a musical scale that formed the medieval Ionian mode and the modern major diatonic calibration.
   

3. The Ionian: This harmony is named fro the Ionians (1 of the 4 master indigenous groups in ancient Greece, and 1 of the 2 most important politically).
   

5. The Dorian: This is the harmony named for the Dorian Greeks (one of the four main ethnic groups in aboriginal Greece, and i of the ii almost of import politically), who were a large and diverse group occupying multiple different states, but also strongly loyal to ane some other, especially in aiding one another during wars or other aggressions.  Its ethical characteristics were thought to be forcefulness and virility.  This harmony formed what nosotros know as the third Church style; it is the model of medieval chant, and not the same equally the modern Dorian mode.
   

7. The Phrygian: From the kingdom of Phrygia in the mountainous areas of Anatolia, which was said to exist wild, its people ecstatically free.  The harmony'south ethical characteristic was said to be overly emotional to the signal of euphoria.  This "calibration" formed what we know every bit medieval and modern Dorian fashion or the first Church building mode.
   

The conclusion apropos harmony, to repeat, is that the ideal country will allow only the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies, those which give courage and inspire bravery, on the one hand, and promote peace and freedom described equally prudent, moderate, and wise (29).

Socrates and Adeimantus then plow to RHYTHM (30).

Rhythm must follow the same rules as they laid down for harmony: those rhythms that will be permitted and promoted in the ideal state are those that cultivate "a mettlesome and harmonious life" (xxx).  Socrates and Adeimantus both claim to not know enough about the categorizations of rhythm (although mention that in that location are three principles from which rhythms are formed and that some of these types include the Cretic, dactylic, iambic, and trochaic rhythms), and say that for these details they must consult Damon, someone Socrates suggests every bit wise in musical matters (scholars suggest Damon strongly influenced Plato's views on music, was a instructor of didactics, and Plutarch identifies him equally the inventor of the "relaxed Lydian way" (de Mus. sixteen)).

The critical importance of rhythm tin can be seen by the following extracts from two of Socrates' mostly rhetorical questions to Adeimantus:

1. -- "… grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm …" (31);
   

3. -- "… skilful and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a expert and bad style …" (31).
   

HARMONY, RHYTHM, and WORDS:

Socrates and Adeimantus then discuss the last component of songs (words/song lyrics) by elucidating the hierarchical interrelation of all three components (words, harmony, and rhythm).  The interaction tin be sketched equally follows:

Words ( logos ):

Give the concept, idea, reason, and story for the song,

thus, the words are the regulating principle for the creation of song

(i.e., the words dictate what harmony and rhythm are chosen for the song, e.g., y'all would non gear up lyrics about your sorrow over a lover's death to a flit, which has a triple meter beat and joyful dance harmony).

Rhythm:

Follows in accord to the words,

and gives the song grace or the absence of grace,

and gives the style for the song

Harmony:

Follows in accord to the style (which follows from the words),

and gives the harmony or disharmony for the song

Thus, the hierarchy of the components of song descends from words to rhythm to harmony.  Still, while the words of song are the regulating principle for the cosmos of song, the audible structure of music, the harmony and rhythm, follow in accord to the words and give music the other two thirds of its affective power.  Thus, in addition to at that place existence a hierarchy, in that location is as well interrelation betwixt these components: all three are critically important in music.

(prototype: a reproduction of the ancient Greek Kithara instrument)

This discussion well-nigh the relation between words, rhythm, and harmony shows how:

(1) the requirements for music parallel the requirements for all other arts,

1. "And surely the fine art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them,—weaving embroidery, compages, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal, and vegetable,—in all of them in that location is grace or the absence of grace.  And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly aligned to sick words and ill nature, equally grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness" (31).
   

3. "… the same control [is] to be extended to other artists … in sculpture and building and the other creative arts …" (31).
   

(2) how music relates to character (the nature of ane's soul), and, thus,

1. "… the words and the grapheme of the style depend on the temper of the soul" (31).
   

1. "And so beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity,—I hateful the truthful simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity which is but an euphemism for folly" (31).  (It may be helpful to read "simplicity" equally "the correct and perfect order.")
   

(3) the importance of music in pedagogy and the ideal state itself.

1. "Simply shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets but to be required past us to limited the image of the good in their works, on hurting, if they do annihilation else, of expulsion from our State?  Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they likewise to be prohibited from exhibiting the reverse forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot adapt to this rule of ours to be prevented from practicing his art in our Country, lest the gustation of our citizens be corrupted by him?  Nosotros would non accept our guardians grown up among images of moral deformity … until they silently gather a festering mass of abuse in their ain soul.  Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the cute and graceful; and so volition our youth dwell in a state of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything ….  At that place can be no nobler preparation than that …" (31-2).
   

1. "… musical training is a more strong musical instrument than any other, considering rhythm and harmony observe their manner into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; … [with] this true education of the inner being … [i] becomes noble and good … and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar" (32).
   

This ends our selection of Book III in the album.

Volume X (pp.32-44):

Socrates begins by reaffirming the definiteness of their before control that imitative verse must be banned from the platonic country.  The reaffirmation comes because, he says, he at present has a far better understanding of the nature of the soul.

1. The Soul: a tripartite model composed of the appetitive (desiring), the spirited (controlling behavior), and the rational (logos); the well-ordered soul is where the rational part controls the lower two parts and makes them desire and human activity correctly; the disordered soul is where the appetitive parts upsets the guild, takes control, leads one to deed rashly and reason to be a slave just to justify disordered action and impulses. {{Click here for more than on the tripartite soul}}
   

To analyze why he is reaffirming the correctness of the ban against imitative poetry, Socrates and Adeimantus seek to clarify mimesis (faux).

This word demands an explanation of Plato's Theory of Forms ( aka Ideas ).

1. To simplify: think of all the many types of tables you can imagine (round ones,

   

   square ones, rectangular ones, tall ones, short ones, java tables, dining tables, 3-legged ones, four-legged ones, etc.); you know all of these to be tables, even if any two may look wholly unlike.  Yous know them, nevertheless, to both be tables because you accept an "Idea" of "Table," which is broad enough to include many different species of tables.

   

   This "idea" or "form" is like the genus, which includes diverse species, or a definition which includes diverse instantiations or examples.  So, if you are a carpenter about to brand a tabular array, you recall the thought or form of table to use as a model to guide your building of an bodily table.  You, as the carpenter may make a tabular array, but you do not make the idea of a table--the idea is something that all accept access to. {{Click Here for more on Plato's Forms}}
   

Now, to move to false, Socrates proposes the idea of an "artist" who holds up a mirror and turns about … via the mirror, this artist "creates" all that he captures by reflection.  But, these "creations" "would be appearances just" (33); this artist is "a creator of appearances" (33).  Socrates proposes that in one sense, we would say all of these creations are untrue, just in another sense, they are true.  So, a painting of a table both IS and IS Non a table.

1. To understand what is meant past "truth," Socrates connects this true/untrue dichotomy to an exists/does-not-exist dichotomy.  This means that the artist with the mirror, the creator of appearances, creates what does not accept actual existence in the aforementioned mode the carpenter'southward table has existence.
   

They move farther to the question by which "we ask who this imitator is" (34).  Socrates points out (using the example of beds, merely you can supply any example) that in that location are 3 beds ( i.e., iii levels of reality) :

1. (1) One exists in nature as made by God (He who makes all that is, the supreme creator who creates the ideas/forms of all that is);
   

2. (ii) Another exists every bit made by the carpenter;
   

3. (3) And the tertiary appears every bit fabricated past the painter.
   

Paradigm: Vincent Van Gogh, "Bedroom in Arles," 1888

They decide the offset ii artists (God and the carpenter) "creators and makers," simply not the painter, instead, the painter is deemed "the imitator of that which the others brand" (35).  So, "yous call him who is 3rd in the descent from nature an imitator" (35).

And so, the carpenter 'imitates' the ideas/forms that God creates and the painter 'imitates' the examples made by the carpenter, which were modeled upon the ideas/forms fabricated past God.  The painters, so, (or poets or whatsoever other imitative art) copy the copies of ideas: they are the tertiary degree from the truth of the thought itself.  Now, how the painters imitate is important: practice they copy the thing itself, or the thing as it appears?

2. "I mean, they you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from whatsoever other bespeak of view, and the bed volition appear different, merely there is no difference in reality.  And the same of all things" (35).
   

In other words, how gimmicky phenomenologists speak of this is through the idea of " horizons ."  Anything has many different horizons, i.e., many different facets that make up the whole.  You lot tin can walk effectually the tabular array, looking at it, and come across every new step around reveals a dissimilar facet or horizon of the table (on this side, you see simply two legs, two sides, and function of the top, move over, and y'all run across iii legs, some other angle, etc.).  All viewing is perspectival: made upwards of one perspective.  Yet, y'all can 'fill in' all the other perspectives past walking around and 'adding upwardly' the facets altogether, or, just utilise your reason (made up of both experience and rational deduction) to know that even if y'all are just seeing this one perspective, what the table is in itself is the whole.

And then, a carpenter makes something in itself, but the painter paints the appearance of a thing:

1. "Which is the art of painting designed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they announced—of appearance or reality?  Of appearance.  Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can practise all things because he lightly touches on a minor part of them, and that role an paradigm.  For example: A painter will pigment a cobbler, carpenter, or any other creative person, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a existent carpenter" (35).
   

The simple person deceived parallels the person who says that the poet or tragedian who creates must have captured the truth itself: both are deceived by illusion.  So, the imitative artist can create while having absolutely no knowledge of the truth of the thing they are representing, and yet fool the people into thinking that this artist knows the truth.  Here is the danger of the imitative arts.

If we idea that Homer (or any other imitative artist) knew the truth of what they represent, and asked him to counsel us on information technology, the 'knowledge' he would give would be fractional or just wrong.  Imagine, for instance, asking a painter who paints skyscrapers how to build one … would you want to follow his insight on matters of construction, or the insight given by a structural engineer?

1. "In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colors of the several arts, himself agreement their nature merely enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and gauge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military machine tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well--such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature take.  And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colors which music puts upon them, and recited in elementary prose" (37).
   

Socrates moves the discussion further past an instance of a painter painting the reins and bit of a equus caballus harness and a craftsman who actually makes the reins and $.25.  But the latter knows the actual correct fashion to make the thing itself.  "And may nosotros non say the same of all things?" (38).

Thus: "in that location are 3 arts which are concerned with all things: 1 which uses, another which makes, a 3rd which imitates them" (38).

The "user" must have the greatest caste of experience of the thing made.  "The flute-player volition tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions" (38).  The imitator, however, for example, the painter who paints a flute, has the least expertise on the thing itself, the flute.  The painter, then, has the least true opinion in the affair of flutes.  And, thus it is in all things. "… imitation has been shown by u.s.a. to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth" (39).

"And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?" (39). This question leads the states to the initial claim about affirming the correctness of the rejection of imitative artists from the platonic country due to a better understanding of the nature of the soul.  In other words, does the painting appeal to the sensory or to the rational?  Our senses can easily be tricked, and pb u.s. to confusion; our minds calculate and discern the truth and tin lead usa to knowledge.  Then, false appeals to the senses, the lower parts of the soul.  If it seduces these, and lead these parts to guide our action and thought, and then we will have a disordered soul.  The imitative artist seeks to appeal to the lowest parts of the soul to be successful (i.due east., the movie or play seeks to deeply upset us to be judged "good," but, in a well-ordered society, do we desire to brand everyone feel anguished and sorrowful, which may lead us to bad deportment?).

1. "[the painter and poet, or whatever imitative artist is] concerned with an inferior office of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered Country, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. … the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less … he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truthful" (42).
   

The greatest danger, however, is that the imitative arts inculcate us in this weakness of reason.  "The power which poetry has of harming fifty-fifty the good (and there are very few who are non harmed)" (42).  Though we may not acknowledge it, we are given license by these arts to follow the base parts of our souls.  When nosotros see or hear of the victims in art giving full way to weeping and intemperate behavior, when nosotros find ourselves victim to sorrow, nosotros experience some license that information technology is okay to be intemperate ourselves; when nosotros meet comedies with lewd and wretched jests, we may never think we would reduce ourselves to that level, but, perhaps in private, nosotros crack the same jokes; when we run into lust or anger unleashed, we may feel more than inclined that this is okay to do.  "Few persons e'er reverberate, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves" (43).

1. What do you think of this?  Do you believe that exposure to imitative arts corrupts the order of your soul (your good character or moral behavior) by inculcating you to a sense of normalcy of irrational responses or by granting yous a sense of free license that it is okay to exist melodramatic or intemperate or crass or lustful or angry, etc.?  Can yous, for case, always watch violent movies, but never become violent?  Can y'all indulge in exploitative arts, only never exploit or condone this in everyday life?
   

Thus, while nosotros practice non diminish the truth of Homer'south luminescence, we notwithstanding judge that he is non to be permitted in our ideal State.  We will permit all the imitative arts to defend themselves, and let them to enter our urban center, simply merely if they can evidence through reason that they will not corrupt or hope to catechumen their arts to forms that merely promote the expert, and not the evil.

This ends our selection of Book X, and all of the selections from the Democracy in our anthology.  Below, you volition find discussion post prompts.

III) Discussion Post Prompts:

On Blackboard, thoughtfully and thoroughly engage any one fix of the three discussion prompt options below: Due Friday, July 11:

(ane) Every bit Tolstoy clearly demonstrates, the definition of art is inextricable from feeling (emotion): emotion is experienced in the artist, who thereby communicates it to united states through his/her art.  Plato is clearly wary of feelings—he recognizes how dangerous they tin be.  Instead, he upholds the "Forms" (aka "Ideas," the truth of something in itself that is attainable through reason alone) as the better, higher, righter goal we ought to seek.  Do you agree that art (the emotional) and truth (the rational) are two unlike pursuits?  When is art better?  When is truth meliorate?  Can fine art ever be truthful?  Can truth e'er be artistic/artful?

(2) Plato'due south Commonwealth expresses the typical Greek view that nosotros are naturally mimetic (i.east., nosotros naturally imitate things, this is how we learn), and therefore, to create the ideal lodge, we must censor what art children are exposed to so that they will grow upward to be virtuous.  Discuss whether you think nosotros are naturally mimetic or non, and whether yous hold that to brand the ideal social club, there should exist censorship.  What are some examples of things our lodge has censored (or does censor)?  Is this censorship right/merely?

(3) Would Tolstoy consider something art if the artist created it to exist expressive of his/her feeling of fright, yet it aroused in viewers the feeling of hilarity?  If not, is it the artist'south error, or the fault of the viewers for 'not getting it?'  Tin can you come upwards with examples of "fine art" that seem to fail?  Are they, for you, withal art?

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